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THE PROPRIETOR-INVITEE RELATIONSHIP AND THE
SUPERIOR-KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
HE proprietor-invitee relationship, always a fertile source of negli-
gence litigation, is governed by well-settled rules. When, however, a
factual situation does not fit these rules, which may at times prove rigid
and inflexible, it becomes imperative that they be disregarded and that
fundamental negligence concepts be applied.
In a recent North Carolina case, Waters v. Harris,1 the plaintiff
customer was injured when he slipped on a greasy substance on a ware-
house floor while the proprietor was showing him used refrigerating
equipment. In an action against the proprietor, the plai{tiff alleged that
there were no lighting facilities in the warehouse' and that the floor
was dark, greasy, and covered with trash.a The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for a nonsuit at the close of the plaintiffs evidence,
holding that there was no evidence of the source of the greasy substance
and no evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that the
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous con-
dition of the floor.4 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, however,
reversed the trial court, apparently on alternative grounds, none of
which is dearly or unequivocally stated as the basis for its decision.5
The law governing a proprietor's duty to invitees requires that he
exercise ordinary care to keep those portions of the premises which he
should anticipate will be used by invitees' in a reasonably safe condition
and warn them of hidden perils and unsafe conditions which he can
ascertain by reasonable inspection and supervision.7 Specifically, as to
125o N.C. 70, ixo S.E.2d 283 (.959)" -
'The plaintiff presented evidence tending to show that, although it was about mid-
day, it was "kind of dark that day"; that it was dark inside the warehouse; that the
defendant did not turn on any lights and did not have a flashlight; that no lighting
equipment was apparent5 and that the only window was covered by a wooden shutter.
25o N.C. at 703, xo S.E.2d at 285.
'Arguably, these conditions were as apparfnt to the plaintiff-invitee as to the de-
fendant-proprietor.
'25o N.C. at 705, sio S.E.2d at 286.
See note 13 infra.
Coston v. Skyland Hotel, 231 N.e. 546, 57 S.E.zd 793 (1950) ; Leavister v. Jesse
French & Sons Piano Co., 185 N.C. 152, 116 S.E. 405 (923).
'E.g., Reese v. Piedmont, Inc., 24o N.C. 391, 82 S.E.2d 365 (954); Lee v. H.L.
Green & Co., 236 N.C. 83, 72 S.E.2d 33 (2952); Fanelty v. Rogers Jewelers, Inc.,
23o N.C. 694, 55 S.E.2d 493 (1949) ; Ross v. Sterling Drug Store, 225 N.C. 2z6, 34
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dangerous conditions not created8 by the proprietor,' he is liable only if
helo had actual notice of the condition or if it existed for such a length of
time" that he should have known it existed and acted to remedy it.1 2
Application of this narrow rule to the Waters case supports the trial
court's decision because that court held that there was no evidence upon
which knowledge of the presence of the greasy substance could be im-
puted to the defendant. If this holding was not, in fact, overruled by
the Supreme Court,'" then a consideration of only the foreign substance
S.E.zd 64 (1945); Bowden v. S.H. Kress & Co., 198 N.C. 559, 152 S.E. 625 (1930).
See generally, PRossER, TORTs § 78 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.1z
(.956).
' Where the proprietor creates the dangerous condition, he has been held to have
knowledge of it and no further notice is deemed necessary. Robinson v. F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 8o Mont. 43!, 761 Pac. 253 (19z7); Lee v. H.L. Green & Co., supra note 7
(oiled floor). See, Copeland v. PhthisiC, 24.5 N.C. 58o, 96 S.E.zd 697 (1957) (waxed
floor); Hughes v. Anchor Enterprises, 245 N.C. 131, 95 S.E.zd 577 (1956) (cleaning
and mopping). See generally, Annots., 63 A.L.R.zd 59x (x959); 63 A.L.R.2d 694(.959).
Where the dangerous condition is a foreign substance, however, the plaintiff may
,prefer to allege general negligence, rather than specifically alleging creation of the
condition, because it is often difficult to prove that the proprietor actually created the
dangerous condition.
'The same is true if the condition is created by an agent or one acting under the
authority of the proprietor. See e.g., Caldwell v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 3x F. Supp. 888
(W.D. Pa. :1940).
"0 If an agent of the proprietor were put on notice of the dangerous condition, such
notice would be imputed to the proprietor. E.g., Vetter v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co.,
322 Pa. 449, i85 Atd. 613 (936).
"
1 The nature of the business, the inherent dangers involved, the location of the de-
fective condition, the opportunity for inspection, and the number of persons reasonably
anticipated to accept the invitation are to be considered in determining what constitutes
an unreasonable time for the unsafe condition to remain undetected. See, e.g., Moore v.
American Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, i8z Atl. 436 (1936). "The greater the likelihood
of danger . .. the greater is the amount of care required in making an inspection of
premises to meet the standard of due care." Long v. Savin Rock Amusement Co., 141
Conn. ISO, 153, 104 A.zd 221, 223 (1954). Negligent ignorance is in law equivalent
to actual knowledge. Easler v. Downie Amusement Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 Atl. 9o5
(1926).
"Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Lamberson, 144 F.2d 97 ( 9 th Cir. 1944), Kipp v.
F.W. Woolworth & Co., i5o App. Div. 283, 134 N.Y. Supp. 646, appeal dismissed, zo6
N.Y. 6z8, 99 N.E. i1o9 (i912); Schwingle v. Kellenberger, 217 N.C. 577, 8 S.E.zd
918 (1940) 5 Fox v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 2o9 N.C. 115, x8z S.E. 66z (x935).
"Whether the floor was in fact safe, or reasonably so, is not the issue, but rather
whether the defendant is chargeable with negligence for a failure to use reasonable and
ordinary or due care to that end." Lander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 141 Me. 422, 4z61
44 A.zd 886, 887 (1945).
"' While the Supreme Court conceded that there was no direct evidence of the source
of the grease, it implied that there might be indirect evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find that the grease leaked from the refrigerating equipment. z5o N.C. at
[Vol. 19 6o: 469
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would not warrant recovery. 14  However, when other factors"5 con-
tribute to the plaintiff's injury this narrow rule should not be decisive.
Instead, all the circumstances should be examined to determine whether
the conduct of the defendant was reasonable. Thus, in the Waters case,
several additional factors, the most important of which was inadequate
lighting, contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Although courts and
commentators have somewhat neglected the importance of such factors
705, 15o S.E.2d at 286. However, the only evidence offered concerning the source of
the grease was the conjecture of the plaintiff and his laundryman (who was not present
at the warehouse, but only examined the substance on the plaintiff's clothes), both of
whom testified to the effect that it "could have been oil out of a compressor or motor
or something like that." On the other hand, the plaintiff testified on cross-examination
that there was no machinery where the grease was located. Therefore, even if it be
conceded that the plaintiff satisfied the burden of going forward with the evidence as
to the source of the foreign substance, his case on this theory of negligence is not very
persuasive.
Also, the Supreme Court implied that there might be indirect evidence tending to
show that the greasy substance had been on the floor long enough for knowledge of its
presence to be imputed to the defendant. To support this, the court stated that the
trash and the rough condition of the floor tended "to show neglect and inattention on
the part of the defendants with respect to their duty to maintain the warehouse floor
in a reasonably safe condition. . . ." 25o N.C. at 705, iio S.E.2d at 286-87. It is
submitted that this is an insufficient basis upon which to impute knowledge of the
presence of the greasy substance to the proprietor. It is generally held that no actionable
negligence can arise out of a failure to sweep, clean, or inspect when there is no evidence
tending to show that the foreign substance causing the fall would have been on the
floor at the time of such action. Long v. Savin Rock Amusement Co., 141 Conn. 5o,
104 A.zd 221 (1954) ; O'Leary v. Smith, 255 Mass. 121, 150 N.E. 878 (1926); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Goldston, iSS S.W.zd 83o (.Tex. Civ. App. i94i); 65 C.J.S. Negli-
gence § 87 (950).
The third alternative ground relied upon by the Supreme Court in reversing the
judgment of the trial court was the failure to provide adequate lighting. The court
stated, "Negligence may consist in the failure so to light the premises as to protect from
injury by reason of dangerous conditions which would not reasonably be discovered in
the absence of such light." 25o N.C. at 706, 11o S.E.zd at 287, quoting 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 86 (i95o). It is submitted that this third ground of reversal will permit
recovery by the plaintiff without overruling the holding of the trial court that there
was no evidence upon which knowledge of the presence of the foreign substance could
be imputed to the defendant.
14 Accord, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Snuggins, 103 F.zd 458 (8th Cir. 1939);
Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 113 A.2d 405 (1955). Fanelty v.
Rogers Jewelers, Inc., 23o N.C. 694, 55 S.E.2d 493 (1949); Brown v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 217 N.C. 368, 8 S.E. 2d 599 (i94o) ; Cooke v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
2o4 N.C. 495, x68 S.E. 679 ('933).
The North Carolina Supreme Court seemed to think this was the basis for the
trial court's finding for the defendant in the Waters case. 25o N.C. at 705, ITO
S.E.2d at z86.
"' See note 25 infra.
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in cases in which the proprietor had neither actual nor constructive
notice of the extraneous substance, 16 two conflicting views have emerged.
The orthodox view imposes liability upon the proprietor only if his
knowledge of the danger at the time of the accident was superior to the
knowledge of the invitee.17 According to this theory, actionable negli-
gence cannot be based solely upon inadequate lighting because this con-
dition is equally obvious to the proprietor and the invitee.'8 The pro-
prietor would be liable only where the existence of some other condition,
of which he had actual or constructive notice,' 9 requires that he provide
'6 In most of the cases in which these additional factors appear, there is no reason
for discussing them because the facts will justify an imputation of knowledge of the
dangerous condition to the proprietor. See Hill Grocery Co. v. Hameker, is Ala.
App. 84, 89 So. 850 (19z) (depression in floor; insuflicient lighting); Kennedy v.
Phillips, 319 Mo. 573, 5 S.W.zd 33 (19z8) (concealed and unguarded elevator
shaft); Drumwright v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., zz8 N.C. 3z5 45 S.E.zd 379
(1947) (concealed steps); Anderson v. Reidsville Amusement Co., 213 N.C. 130,
195 S.E. 386 (938) (improperly waxed floor in dim light); Manley v. Haus,
113 Vt. 217, 3z A.zd 668 (1943) (unlighted stair well in garage); Raylass Chain
Stores, Inc. v. De Jarnette, 163 Va. 938, 178 S.E. 34 (1935) (stairway concealed by
merchandise); Lindsey v. Bluefield Produce & Provision Co., 91 W. Va. 1iS, 112
S.E. 310 (92) (unguarded elevator shaft; dim light).17McKeighan v. Kline's, Inc., 339 Mo. 523, 98 S.W.2d 555 (1936); Barrans
v. Hogan, 6z N.M. 79, 304 P.zd 88o (1956); Revis v. Orr, 234 N.C. 158, 66
S.E.zd 652 (x95i); Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Hambright, 130 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.
Civ. App. '939); Worth Food Markets, Inc. v. Le Baume, 112 S.W.zd 1o89 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) (dictum) ; 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 97 (1941). See also, Keeton,
Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, oo U. PA. L. REV.
629, 634 (.952).
"Walker v. Greenberger, 63 Cal. App. 2d 457, 147 P.2d 105 (1944); Bisceglia
v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 350 Mich. i59, 85 N.W.zd 91 (1957); Schwartz v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 238 Mo. App. 1165, x85 S.W.zd 37 (1944); Revis v. Orr, 234
N.C. 158, 66 S.E.2d 65z (1951); Robert E. McKee, Gen. Contractor, Inc., v. Pat-
terson, 153 Tex. 517, z71 S.W.2d 391 (1954)5 Houston Nat'l Bank v. Adair, x46
Tex. 387, 207 S.W.zd 374 (1948). See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §343 (934); id.
§893 0930)
Although courts adhering to the superior-knowledge requirement are uniform in
holding that there is no liability where the condition is open and obvious to the
plaintiff, there is a great deal of unresolved conflict as to the grounds for the de-
fendant's immunity. Some courts argue that there -is no breach of duty by the
proprietor because his duty extends only to warning the invitee of conditions which
the latter would not, in the exercise of ordinary care, discover for himself. Other
courts reason that, although the proprietor is negligent, the invitee, in encountering
the obvious danger, is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See generally,
Comment, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 176 (s953).
1" Beck v. Stanley Co. of America, 355 Pa. 6o8, 50 A.zd 306 (1947); De Clerico
v. Gimbel Bros., 16o Pa. Super. 197, 50 A.zd 7x6 (x94). See Revis v. Orr, 234
N.C. i58, 66 S.E.zd 652 (951).
It has been argued that lack of a duty in some instances "does not mean and
[Vol. 196o: 469
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adequate lighting to reveal that condition to an invitee who would not
otherwise be fully cognizant of its presence.2" If this theory is applied
to the Waters case, the proprietor is absolved of liability for the plain-
tiff's injury because he is not required to provide lighting in anticipation
of some unknown danger.21
There is increasing dissatisfaction with the superior knowledge re-
quirement, however. A number of courts have watered down this limi-
tation on the proprietor's liability by refusing to find that the plaintiff
had equal knowledge of the danger.22 Moreover, several recent cases
should not mean that the defendant has acted prudently. It simply means that even
though he was guilty of anti-social conduct and conduct that should be discouraged,
the achievement of other socially desirable ends or objectives that will be hindered
by shifting the loss from the defendant to the plaintiff is a weightier consideration."
Keeton, supra note 17, at 632.
For illustrations of cases invoking liability because of the proprietor's notice, see
note 16 supra.
"5 The proprietor is under no duty to provide more illumination where the con-
dition is obvious to the invitee despite the poor lighting. Reese v. Piedmont, Inc.,
24o N.C. 39i, 8z S.E.2d 365 (i954) 5 Benton v. United Bank Bldg. CO., 223 N.C.
S09, 28 S.E.zd 491 (1944).
Negligence arising out of a failure to provide adequate lighting can be analogized
to negligence arising out of a failure to sweep, dean, or inspect the premises. In
these cases, there is no actionable negligence unless there is an intimation that such
action would have revealed the dangerous condition. See cases cited note 13 supra.
2C Cf., De Santis v. New Eng. Furn. Co., 132 Conn. 134, 42 A.zd 792 (1945);
Thomas v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 114 N.E.zd 863 (Ohio App.
1952) ; Dooley v. Economy Store, io9 Vt. 138, 194 Atl. 375 (937)-
"This result is often justified by imputing to the proprietor technical knowledge
of the construction of the premises or appliances thereon or of the risk involved.
See, e.g., Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire, 39 Cal. zd 481, 247 P.2d 335 (952)
(amount of stress that safety pin in a swivel seat could withstand) Gobrecht v.
Beckwith, 8z N.H. 45, 135 Ad. 2o (T926) (landlord held to knowledge that a
gas heater gives off carbon monoxide); Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., 255 N.Y.
442, 175 N.E. 123 (1931) (strength of cement); Brown v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 217 N.C. 368, 8 S.E.zd 199 (1940) (escapability of machine oils in washing
machine); RF.STATEMENT, ToRTs § 343, comment f (1934). See generally, Negli-
gence, Knowledge, Minimum Standard of Knowledge, Duty To Know, 23 MINN.
L. REV. 6z8 (1939)-
On the other hand, some courts have evaded the superior-knowledge limitation
by concluding that there was an excusable lack of knowledge on behalf of the plain-
tiff. See, Tucker v. Tolerton & Warfield Co., 249 Iowa 405, 86 N.W.2d 8zz (-957)
(plaintiff's eyes were not yet accustomed to the darkness); Dawes v. J.C. Penney &
Co., 236 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (plaintiff might not notice the amount
of mud on the floor)5 Blanks v. Southland Hotel, 149 Tex. 139, 229 S.W.2d 357
(i95o) (accident occurred at night; plaintiff had used the stairs previously only
during the daytime). Considerable leeway has been obtained in the application of
this principle by use of language to the effect that apprehension of some danger
should not be confused with full appreciation of the risk. Firestone Serv. Stores v.
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have abrogated the limitation and held the defendant liable, even
though the invitee had equal knowledge of the danger, when the risk
of harm was great enough and the situation could easily have been
remedied.2 3 Arguably, recovery should be permitted even if the invitee
had superior knowledge of the dangerous condition. The superior
knowledge of one of the parties is treated as only one factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether, under all the circumstances, an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to the invitee should have been foreseen.2 4 Other
considerations, 2 5 such as the invitee's justification in encountering the
danger,26 are also pertinent. This approach to the problem thus utilizes
Gillen, 58 Ga. App. 782, 199 S.E. 853 (1938); Loney v. Laramie Auto Co-, 36
Wyo. 339, 255 Pac. 350 (1927).
"Dean v. Safeway Stores, 300 S.W.zd 431 (Mo. 1957); Petera v. Railway
Exch. Bldg., 42 S.W.zd 947 (Mo. App. 193); 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra
note 7, §27-3- See Markee v. Turner, 140 Conn. 701, 103 A.2d 533 (1954);
Williamson v. Derry Elect. Co., 89 N.H. z6, 196 Atl. 265 (1938); Renfro Drug
Co. v. Jackson, 81 S.W.zd ioi (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Konopka v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 133 W. Va. 775, 58 S.E.zd xz8 (1950).
2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 7, § 27.13 n.23.
"These additional considerations may bear on one or both of the distinct lines of
duty involved-that is, the proprietor's duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and the invitee's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect himself.
Factors which would be considered in determining whether there has been a breach
of duty on the part of the proprietor include the character of the premises (warehouse
or super market), the number of invitees whose presence should reasonably be antici-
pated, the precautions taken, the location of the danger, the reasonable safety with which
the danger can be encountered by one who knows of the risk, the alternative means pro-
vided whereby the invitation may be accepted without encountering the danger, the pres-
ence and location of distractions, and the feasibility of removing the source of danger.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Boston Penny Say. Bank, 301 Mass. 540, 17 N.E.2d 899 (1938);
Dean v. Safeway Stores, 300 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1957); Petera v. Railway Exeh. Bldg., 42
S.W.zd 947 (Mo. App. 1931); Williamson v. Derry Elect. Co., 89 N.H. z6, 196
Adt. z65 (1938).
Illustrative factors bearing on whether there has been a breach of the invitee's duty
are contained in: Wilson v. Raider, 317 Mass. 23, 56 N.E.zd 887 (1944) (express or
implied invitation); Polm v. Hession, 363 Pa. 494, 70 A.zd 311 (1950) (the degree of
darkness) ; Vetter v. Great Ait. & Pac. Tea Co., 322 Pa. 449, 185 At1. 613 (1936)
(invitee's right to assume that the premises are safe) ; Kerr v. Bullocks, Inc., 75 Cal.
App. zd 277, 170 P.2d 966 (1946) (the reasonable safety with which the danger can
be encountered); and Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 36, I11 P.2d 72 (1941)
(opportunity to avoid the danger). "[M]ere knowledge of the dangerous condition...
was not alone sufficient to bar a recovery, unless the hazard resulting from its use was
so imminent that no reasonably prudent person would have made the attempt."' South-
ern Pac. Co., v. McCready, 47 F.zd 673, 677 ( 9 th Cir. 1931).
1" In view of the factors present in the Waters case-that the proprietor expressly
invited and personally led the invitee into the building, that the invitee was following
immediately behind the proprietor in the latter's chosen route and speed, and that the
invitee was given no warning of danger (other than the lack of adequate lighting) at
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fundamental negligence concepts, rather than narrow, inflexible rules,
to determine the question of liability.
Applied to the Waters case, a jury might reasonably find the pro-
prietor negligent on the ground that his conduct threatened a foreseeable
result 7 involving an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff.2" If due
care required that the proprietor furnish more light, and he failed to
remedy that source of danger, he should be liable for the resulting harm,
even if his knowledge of the dangerous condition was no greater than
that of the invitee.29
While the superior-knowledge limitation on the landowner's liability
enjoys long-standing support, 0 it should not be decisive in all cases.31
Rather, the factual situation in each case should determine its applica-
bility. The Waters case is a cogent illustration. The proprietor has
ample opportunity to exercise deliberate judgment in providing suffi-
cient lighting facilities. Moreover, under modern conditions, there is
no justification for inadequate lighting of business premises. The pro-
prietor is under a duty to make his business premises reasonably safe.
This duty should include maintenance of adequate lighting facilities,
enabling the invitee to ascertain the actual condition of the premises and
intelligently decide if he should "accept the invitation."32 Poor illumi-
any time prior to the accident-a jury might reasonably find that the plaintiff was
justified in relying on the defendant's performance of his duty to maintain the premises
in such a reasonably safe condition that no light was necessary for the contemplated uses
thereof and for the purposes for which the invitation was extended.
"The court stated that "it was reasonably foreseeable" that grease and oil might
leak from the motors and moving parts of the secondhand refrigerating equipment. zso
N.C. at 7o6, 1to S.E.2d at 287 (dictum).
' It is submitted that this finding of negligence should be allowed even though the
foreseeable result might be found to have been brought about by an unforeseeable cause.
See Sledge v. Wagoner, 248 N.C. 631, 1o4 S.E.zd 195 (1958). See generally, PROSSER,
ToRTs §§ 48-49 (2d ed. 1955), especially pp. 278-805 Comment, 196o DUKE L.J. 88.
"4Accord, Dean v. Safeway Stores, 300 S.W.zd 431 (Mo. 1957) 5 Petera v. Railway
Exch. Bldg., 42 S.W.zd 947 (Mo. App. 1931). See, e.g., Markee v. Turner, i4o
Conn. 701, 103, A.2d 533 (1954); Nelson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 48 N.J. Super.
300, 137 A.2d 599 (App. Div. 1958) i Renfro Drug Co. v. Jackson, 81 S.W.2d ioi
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; O'Flaherty v. Tarrou, 130 W. Va. 326, 43 S.E.2d 392 (1947).
"0 See notes 17 & 18 supra.
" Although these modifications would nullify the superior-knowledge requirement
as a strict limitation on the proprietor's liability, it would leave intact most of his tra-
ditional protection. Most of the decisions denying liabilty under the orthodox superior-
knowledge theory could be equally explainable either on a finding that the invitee was
contributorily negligent or on an absence of a finding that the proprietor acted un-
reasonably.
'2 Cf., RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343, comment a (934).
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nation deprives the invitee "of his opportunity to guard against hazards
which could not otherwise be obviated by the proprietor.
333
" Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landoumer Cases, 29 MINN. L. REv.6x, 82 (1945).
